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An Inconsistent Chevron Standard:
Refining Chevron Deference in Immigration Law
Juan P. Caballero*
Recent developments in the composition of the Supreme Court have fueled
academic and journalistic speculation about the future of one of the
foundational cases in modern administrative law, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Thirty-five
years ago, Chevron established the current legal foundation for judicial
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. This
Article contains an empirical study of the manner in which courts of appeals
have applied Chevron in one specific area of administrative law:
immigration law.
Immigration law provides a unique case study because it implicates a
number of legal and constitutional considerations related to national
security, foreign relations, civil rights, international human rights, and
criminal law. In contrast to other areas of administrative law, the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the modern deference regime—expertise,
political accountability, and delegation—apply with varying force within
immigration law, depending on the particular nature of the statutory
interpretation at issue, and with inconsistent results. Despite these variables,
or perhaps because of them, the judiciary has developed inconsistent
practices in its application of Chevron in immigration cases.
This Article presents an empirical study of 473 instances of statutory
interpretation where federal circuit courts considered the application of
Chevron deference in immigration cases during an eleven-year period from
2003 to 2013. The study considers the factors and elements within
immigration cases that produce distinct results in the courts’ precedent.
This study finds that three categories of variables shape the manner and
frequency with which courts of appeals apply Chevron. First, the nature of
* Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Yale University, B.A., 2012; New
York University, J.D., 2016. I am indebted to professors David and Veronica Thronson for their
advice, support, and infinite patience. Thank you to professors Carla Reyes, Geeyoung Min,
Michael Sant’Ambrogio, and Beth Zilberman for generously sharing their comments, expertise and
encouragement throughout this project. Special thank you to professors Barbara O’Brien and
Catherine Grosso for their invaluable feedback and for helping me make sense of the data discussed
in this Article.
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the immigration case may lead to strikingly different rates of application and
agency success. Of the categories of immigration cases studied by this paper,
courts apply Chevron at starkly lower rates when the legal issue concerns
the government’s authority to detain the noncitizen or the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions (“crimmigration”). In contrast, courts
apply Chevron at rates consistent with other areas of administrative law in
cases where a noncitizen has affirmatively initiated the litigation or is in
removal proceedings regardless of the relief sought. Second, the formality of
the agency’s underlying interpretation also affects the frequency with which
courts apply Chevron. This variable, however, does not appear to influence
the court differently in immigration cases than it does in administrative law
cases, generally. Finally, geography matters when considering court’s
willingness or hesitation in applying Chevron in immigration cases. There
exists significant disparities in circuits’ application of Chevron in
immigration cases. These findings illustrate invisible trends in the appellate
courts’ jurisprudence and informs ongoing debates about Chevron’s role in
immigration cases, as well as in administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
In Pereira v. Sessions, the Supreme Court reviewed the interpretation
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of an immigration statute
describing the requirements for a Notice to Appear, the document that
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initiates removal proceedings.1 Writing for the majority, Justice
Sotomayor found that the statutory language at issue, which had been
previously interpreted by the First Circuit and several administrative
judges to varying results, did not support the application of Chevron
deference,2 because it was not sufficiently ambiguous.3 Despite the
majority’s conclusion that the statutory language was unambiguous, the
question of whether to defer to the agency’s interpretation turned
contentious.
In a lone concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted his displeasure with
lower courts’ (mis)application of Chevron in recent years.4 In one of his
final opinions as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy
decried the judiciary’s abdication of its role in interpreting federal
statutes.5 Specifically, Justice Kennedy criticized the lower courts’
“reflexive deference” in immigration cases and the lower courts’
unreasoned affirmances of the interpretations of immigration statutes by
the BIA.6 While he agreed with the majority’s conclusion in Pereira,
Justice Kennedy noted that the lower courts had reached the opposite
conclusion based on their cursory analysis of the statute.7 The problem,
in Justice Kennedy’s view, was that lower courts would summarily
conclude that immigration statutes were ambiguous before fully applying
the “ordinary tools of statutory construction.”8 His resignation palpable,
Justice Kennedy concluded his concurrence with a general call to
reconsider the underpinnings of Chevron in some future case.9
While Justice Kennedy wrote separately to address the lower courts’
perceived overzealous application of Chevron, Justice Alito penned a
1. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018).
2. In Chevron, the Court articulated a two-step analytical framework for clarifying statutory
ambiguity. First, a reviewing court must determine whether the statute is ambiguous. If the
reviewing court concludes that the statute is ambiguous, it must then progress to the second step to
determine whether the agency’s proposed interpretation is reasonable enough to receive deference.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
3. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14 (“[T]he Court need not resort to Chevron deference, as some
lower courts have done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the
interpretive question at hand.”) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). See also id. at 2120
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that at least six Courts of Appeal had found the language of 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) ambiguous and the BIA’s interpretation to be reasonable).
4. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In according Chevron deference to
the BIA’s interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis of the questions
whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be
discerned . . . .”) (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 2121 (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the
premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”).
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lone dissent wherein he expressed his concern with the manner of the
majority’s application of the deference doctrine in the case under
consideration. Justice Alito’s dissent took issue with what he described
as the Court’s rejection of the government’s statutory interpretation in
favor of one that it preferred—actions which would violate the Chevron
precedent if accurate.10 While acknowledging the Chevron deference’s
questionable future, he accused the majority of undermining the
precedent by disingenuously concluding there was no statutory
ambiguity.
In essence, both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and Justice Alito’s
dissent express dueling concerns about the current state of the Chevron
doctrine in the courts. While such debates about the continued viability
of Chevron are not novel in the Supreme Court,11 it is appropriate that
these diametrically opposed views of the same doctrine arose in an
immigration case.12 The justices’ frustrations with lower courts’
application of Chevron deference are echoed by legal scholars who have
studied the doctrine’s application in immigration cases.13 These scholars
have documented the unpredictable application of Chevron deference in
immigration cases, and, in some instances, have attempted to articulate
organizing principles for this seemingly erratic jurisprudence.
This Article builds on previous empirical studies and shows that within
immigration law there is a variety of legal issues and deference
considerations that affect the manner and frequency with which courts
apply Chevron deference. In particular, this Article challenges the use of
“immigration law” as a singular label in such studies and proposes the
introduction of a wider vocabulary when analyzing and discussing these
10. Alito dissenting:
[H]ere, a straightforward application of Chevron requires us to accept the
Government’s construction of the provision at issue. But the Court rejects the
Government’s interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading
of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court, for whatever reason, is
simply ignoring Chevron.
Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 318 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s history of applying Chevron).
12. What’s more, Justice Kennedy’s criticisms appear targeted at lower courts’ application of
Chevron in immigration cases specifically. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 513–17
(2019) (describing the Court’s application of Chevron deference in different immigration cases);
Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
99, 116 (2017) (examining efforts to discredit Chevron deference); Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas
Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 163–66 (2015) (questioning the application of Chevron deference in
immigration detention challenges); Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron
Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 530–35 (2003) (comparing the immigration rule of lenity
and Chevron deference).

2020]

An Inconsistent Chevron Standard

183

cases. “Immigration law,” as currently conceived and applied by scholars
and jurists, is too broad and amorphous of a category to provide
meaningful categorization of the Chevron precedent.14 To illustrate this
point, this Article adapts a data set compiled by professors Kent Barnett
and Christopher J. Walker to study appellate courts’ application of
Chevron deference.15 In adapting this data set, I identify six distinct
subcategories of “immigration” cases and analyze the manner and
frequency with which courts of appeal apply Chevron deference in each
subcategory.16 This Article also finds that the formality of the agency’s
underlying action and geographic variables also play key roles in shaping
the jurisprudential landscape.17 While formality shapes the application of
Chevron in immigration cases in a manner similar to other areas of
administrative law, geographic considerations diverge significantly.18
This Article is structured into three parts. Part I discusses the
foundations of Chevron generally and its application in immigration
cases. This section explores Chevron’s inconsistent history in
immigration cases almost from the doctrine’s inception. Part II discusses
the basis and structure of earlier empirical studies, including the BarnettWalker study that serves as a foundation for the current study. This
section discusses the current study’s coding decisions and methodology,
as well as limitations on the data used. The third and final section presents
the results of this study and the implications of these findings for future
discussions.
I. CHEVRON IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Few cases in American history have garnered as much attention from
academics, lawyers, and the judiciary as the Supreme Court’s 1984
decision Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.19 Chevron plays an outsized role in modern administrative law
because it is often considered by scholars to have supplanted prior
Supreme Court precedent regarding agency deference with a singular
14. See infra Part I.
15. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2017) [hereinafter Chevron in the Circuit Courts]. Kent Barnett et. al., Administrative Law’s
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (2018) [hereinafter Administrative Law’s Political
Dynamics] (analyzing the same data set); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step
Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2018) [hereinafter Chevron Step Two’s Domain]
(analyzing the same data set). See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark,
ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 254–55 (2014) (discussing the frequency of law review articles and the
judiciary citing to Chevron and comparing Chevron to other prominent cases).
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formula governing the administration of deference to an agency’s
statutory interpretation.20 This precedent has become so pervasive that
the decision is simply referred as “Chevron” with no concern that it will
be confused with any of the number of other lawsuits surrounding the
eponymous, global conglomerate with a reputation for litigious
behavior.21 Indeed, Chevron has become so prodigious in the legal
parlance that it has inspired law students to choreograph, practice, and
perform satirical dances referencing this case that is ubiquitous in law
schools.22
Despite Chevron’s pervasiveness, legal scholars have long criticized
courts’ capricious application of the precedent. Empirical studies have
repeatedly found that Chevron is not applied with the rigor or consistency
that a strict reading of the precedent would require.23 A great deal of ink
20. The Supreme Court has a long and storied history of reviewing agency’s statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(concerning deference to executive interpretations involving foreign affairs and national security);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 411 (1945) (concerning deference to agency
interpretations of their own regulation); Beth Israel Hosp. v. Nat. Labor Rels. Bd., 437 U.S. 483,
500 (1978) (concerning deference to statutory interpretations); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (concerning deference to statutory interpretations). See
also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–
1120 (2008) (analyzing agency-interpretation cases to develop a continuation approach to
deference).
21. Amanda Ernst, America’s Most Litigious Energy Companies, LAW 360 (Feb. 14, 2007,
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/18608/america-s-most-litigious-energy-companies
[https://perma.cc/VBV5-M4YB] (listing Chevron Corp. as the second most litigious energy
company with 208 new cases in 2006); Daniel Fisher, Fighting ‘Misguided’ Lawsuits, Chevron
Shows It Can Play the Climate Change Blame Game Too, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/02/01/facing-meritless-lawsuits-chevron-saysit-can-play-the-climate-change-blame-game-too/#7419635c7cd4 [https://perma.cc/9NV8-7T57]
(“Chevron has a reputation for deploying aggressive and innovative litigation strategies.”).
22. See Lewie Briggs, The Chevron Two Step, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHKujqyktJc [https://perma.cc/X6R5-HTXD] (demonstrating
law students choreographing and performing a dance referencing Chevron).
23. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 20 at 1120–26 (2008) (offering statistics showing
numerous times the Court did not apply the Chevron doctrine even though it appeared applicable);
see generally Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent:
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010) (finding that Justices apply Chevron differently in different
contexts); Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial
Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 271 (2008) (“Analysis of the Roberts Court
cases shows that classic Chevron analysis is dead—or at least critically wounded. Unfortunately, it
appears that stray bullets, in the form of inconsistent applications of the doctrine, may have done it
in.”). See also Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine:
Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783,
833 (2007) (“A new model for judicial review of agency interpretations seems to be emerging. That
model is one in which the mandatory obligation to defer, set forth in Chevron, is limited.”);
Kagan, supra note 13, at 494 (“At a surface level, the Supreme Court has sent mixed messages
about whether deference would be appropriate in these cases. On the one hand, the Court has
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has been spilled attempting to make sense of the judiciary’s seemingly
idiosyncratic application of Chevron. Nowhere is this inconsistent
application more pronounced than in immigration law.
A. Chevron’s Inconsistent Gas Mileage in Immigration Cases
Chevron is intricately woven into the fabric of modern immigration
law. Although the precedent emerged in a case concerning environmental
law, it took a mere three years for the Supreme Court to formally
recognize Chevron’s application in immigration cases.24 During the three
years between Chevron’s publication and its extension into immigration,
the Supreme Court cited the now-foundational precedent three times.25
While Chevron was cited in these interim decisions, it was cited for the
simple proposition that courts generally owed agency decisions deference
and not to invoke the two-step analysis with which it is currently
associated.26 It would take some time before Chevron’s highly structured
deference formula transformed into the seminal principle of modern
administrative law.27
The Court revisited the analytical underpinnings of Chevron three
years later in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, an immigration case where the
Court attempted to articulate restrictions on the precedent that were not
present at the outset. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court considered
the phrases “well-founded fear of persecution” and “clear probability of
persecution” as used in the asylum and withholding of removal statutes,
respectively.28 The statutes did not define either phrase. Contrary to the
petitioner’s proposed interpretation of the relevant language, both the
immigration judge and the BIA concluded that these two phrases denote
the same legal standard for these two distinct forms of immigration
relief.29 Justice Stevens, author of the Chevron decision three years prior,
wrote the majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca wherein he noted that the
statutory language at issue was ambiguous and that gaps in the statutory
language, whether implicit or explicit, required courts to defer to the
repeatedly said, clearly and strongly, that courts should defer to the Attorney General’s
interpretation of immigration laws, as the Chevron doctrine prescribes.”).
24. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987)
(applying Chevron).
25. Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 33–69 (2013) (describing Chevron’s slow adoption by
court of appeals). See also Kagan, supra note 13, at 497 (2019) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court
announced Chevron, it was understood as a more narrow decision about environmental law.”).
26. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Cornelius v.
Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 659 (1985); United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 667 (1986).
27. Lawson & Kam, supra note 25, at 33–69 (discussing the progression of courts’ of appeals
citations to Chevron).
28. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421.
29. Id. at 425.
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agency.30 Justice Stevens quoted his earlier opinion, declaring that the
judiciary, not the agency, is the “final authority” in interpreting statutes
before clarifying Chevron’s role in cases that involve “pure question[s]
of statutory construction” and mixed questions of law and fact.31
According to Justice Stevens, Chevron applied in the latter category of
cases, while the judiciary’s interpretation controlled in the former.32
Thus, in the process of broadening Chevron’s application to immigration
cases, the Court simultaneously narrowed the precedent to cases raising
“pure” legal questions.33 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the
question at issue in Cardoza-Fonseca was a pure legal question to which
Chevron did not apply.34
This revised Chevron standard did not go unchallenged. In a lone
dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s discussion of Chevron
deference as an unnecessary and unjustified rewriting of the precedent.35
Justice Scalia’s relatively restrained dissent contended that the majority
opinion was wrong to raise the specter of Chevron in a case where it did
not apply. He took special umbrage with the majority’s reworking of
Chevron in what amounted, in his view, to dicta. Justice Scalia would
ultimately be proven correct as courts silently abandoned Justice
Stevens’s pure/mixed question framework for applying Chevron.36
While Cardoza-Fonseca survived to the modern era of administrative
30. Id. at 448.
31. Id. at 446–47.
32. Id. at 447–48.
33. The pure/mixed question distinction had appeared previously in Supreme Court discussions
of deference.
34. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since the Court quite rightly
concludes that the INS’s interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase
and the structure of the Act . . . there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion of
whether the interpretation is entitled to deference.”).
35. Id. at 453–54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Even more unjustifiable, however, is the
Court’s use of this superfluous discussion as the occasion to express controversial, and I believe
erroneous, views on the meaning of this Court’s decision in Chevron.”).
36. While courts of appeal initially attempted to apply Justice Stevens’s narrowing framework
in earnest, the pure/mixed question distinction largely disappeared from the Court’s jurisprudence
within a year. See generally Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989); Pittston Coal Grp. v.
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). See also
Kagan, supra note 13, at 517–18 (discussing the Court’s quick abandonment of the Stevens
framework).
[C]ardoza-Fonseca gave rise to a brief period of uncertainty in the lower
courts over whether Chevron still applied to pure questions of law. By the end
of the next Term, however, the Court was again applying the Chevron doctrine
(irregularly, as ever) to questions of law, and Cardoza-Fonseca quietly
dropped from sight.
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 986
(1992). The pure/mixed question distinction does, however, still appear sporadically in
court of appeal discussions of Chevron.
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law, it has largely been stripped of Justice Stevens’s narrowing principles
and now stands solely for the proposition that Chevron applies to all cases
of statutory interpretation within administrative law. While Justice
Stevens’s pure-legal or mixed-fact-and-legal question framework
disappeared from Supreme Court jurisprudence, it nevertheless continues
to have lingering influence in courts of appeals’ discussions of the
precedent.37
Although Cardoza-Fonseca appeared to broaden Chevron’s
application, the Court’s invocation of the deference precedent created an
unclear foundation for its application in immigration cases broadly. This
confusion was compounded five years later in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
another asylum case raising a question of statutory interpretation where
the Court was tasked with determining whether a Guatemalan guerilla
group’s coercive practices constituted “persecution on account of . . .
political opinion” under the asylum statute.38 Although the case involved
a seemingly ambiguous statute, the Court made no mention of Chevron.
What’s more, the question in Elias-Zacarias arguably presented the Court
with precisely the type of mixed question of law and fact that Justice
Stevens described as warranting Chevron deference.39 Both the majority
opinion and dissent cited INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca; however, they did so
solely for the opinion’s discussion of the asylum statute.40 It is unlikely
that the Court’s decision to ignore Chevron was a mere oversight since
the government raised Chevron in its briefing and the court discussed
deference during oral argument.41 While the first post-Chevron
37. See, e.g., De Leon v. Holder, 761 F.3d 336, 341 n.4 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]his case presents a
pure question of law, as the many appellate opinions assessing freedom from official restraint
confirm.”); Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Dinnall’s Petition presents a
legal question, and our review is therefore de novo; the agency’s views garner no special
deference.”); Mayers v. Dep’t of Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 175 F.3d 1289, 1301–02 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“It is far from clear, however, that deference is appropriate under these
circumstances. . . . The question of a statute’s effective date is generally considered to be a pure
question of law for courts to decide.”) (citations omitted); contra Santos-Quiroa v. Lynch, 816 F.3d
160, 167 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (“[H]is petition presents us with ‘pure questions of law,
triggering de novo review.’ Aguirre v. Holder, 728 F.3d 548, 552 (1st Cir. 2013). Even under the
de novo standard, however, we have recognized that because immigration law frequently implicates
some expertise in matters of foreign policy, BIA interpretations of the statutes and regulations it
administers are accorded substantial deference.”); Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 612 (5th Cir.
2014) (applying Skidmore deference to a “pure question of law” because the BIA failed to issue a
precedential opinion on the question before it).
38. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 479 (1992).
39. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987).
40. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481–82; id. at 485, 487, 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Brief for the Petitioner, Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478
(1992) (No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 11003946, at *23–24. See also Kagan, supra note 13, at 518
(discussing the Court not applying Chevron deference in its decision in Elias-Zacarias despite the
government asking for application of the deference); Transcript of Oral Argument, Immigr. &
Naturalization Servs. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342), at 49.
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immigration case held that the deference standard extended to
immigration cases, the Court’s subsequent immigration jurisprudence
reintroduced uncertainty into its application in such cases.
It would be another seven years before the Court would return to the
question of Chevron’s role in immigration cases and provide some muchneeded clarity on the matter. It did so in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre. 42 Much
like Elias-Zacarias and Cardoza-Fonseca, Aguirre-Aguirre concerned a
petitioner’s eligibility for humanitarian forms of relief from removal.43
In contrast to these prior cases; however, this time the Court conclusively
affirmed Chevron’s role in immigration cases and applied the two-step
analysis in a manner consistent with our current understanding of
Chevron.44
Following this tumultuous beginning, there is no longer any question
that Chevron applies in immigration cases. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court still maintains an inconsistent record of applying Chevron
deference in immigration cases.45 This inconsistency has not gone
unnoticed by members of the Court or legal scholars.46
42. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418 (1999) (“We granted
certiorari to consider the analysis employed by the Court of Appeals in setting aside a determination
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).”).
43. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 418. While both Cardoza-Fonseca and Elias-Zacarias
concerned petitioner’s eligibility for asylum, Aguirre-Aguirre concerned petitioner’s eligibility for
a different but related form of relief known as withholding of removal.
44. Id. at 424–25 (“It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme . . . . In addition, we have recognized that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is
especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive
political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See Kagan, supra note 13, at 518–19 (“Since Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court has more
consistently deferred to the Attorney General in cases concerning eligibility for asylum. Even in
cases where the government lost, the Court sometimes applied the ordinary remand rule to send the
case back for administrative interpretation in the first instance.”).
45. Compare Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56 (2014) (“Principles of Chevron
deference apply when the BIA interprets the immigration laws.”), and Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.
511, 516 (2009) (“Consistent with the rule in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, the BIA is entitled to
deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA.”), with Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 696–97 (2001) (concluding that although Congress has plenary power to create immigration
law, the Judicial Branch does defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decision making with
regards to immigration detention), and Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (making no mention
of Chevron or deference generally).
46. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing concern with developments in the Chevron jurisprudence); id. at 2129 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“In recent years, several Members of this Court have questioned Chevron’s
foundations . . . . But unless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has somehow
escaped my attention, it remains good law.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Shruti Rana,
Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an
Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 343–59 (2012) (examining immigration cases to
discuss recent revisions in the deference regime by the Supreme Court); Nicholas R. Bednar &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1398 (2017)
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B. Immigration Variability and Disaggregation
The judiciary’s inconsistent application of Chevron is not a feature
unique to immigration law. A veritable cottage industry of administrative
law scholars has developed over the years to study and evaluate trends in
courts’ inconsistent application of Chevron. One of these empirical
studies of Chevron’s application is notable in its attempt to provide a
comprehensive study of this phenomenon as it occurs in courts of appeals.
In their 2017 study, Barnett and Walker studied appellate courts’
application of Chevron in administrative law cases globally.47 Their
expansive data set included immigration cases along with a litany of cases
from other areas of administrative law, such as telecommunications,
housing, employment, tax, and Indian affairs, to name a few.48 While the
study identified a number of variables that shaped courts of appeals’
application of Chevron, they notably found that what they labeled
“immigration law” frequently constituted outliers which repeatedly
skewed their findings. Specifically, the authors found that including
immigration cases in the calculation of global averages for Chevron
application rates and agency win rates would depress the overall rate by
up to ten percent.49 In an attempt to reach findings that were in “closer
parity,” Barnett and Walker frequently excised the immigration cases
from their calculations.50 These two scholars briefly noted idiosyncrasies
in the structure of the agencies administering immigration laws were
likely the cause of these aberrations, but they did not explore the issue
further.51
This study returns to these immigration interpretations in order to
better understand why these cases produced such wildly different results.
However, this first requires a discussion of what constitutes “immigration
law.” The Barnett-Walker study omitted any discussion of their definition
of “immigration law.” It is not unique in this regard as many previous
empirical studies have adopted the Justice Potter Stewart approach52

(commenting on the inconsistency with Chevron jurisprudence); Michael Kagan, Loud and Soft
Anti-Chevron Decisions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 43 (2018) [hereinafter Anti-Chevron
Decisions] (noting the inconsistencies in Chevron’s history).
47. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 35–36 (describing the study’s findings
when looked at globally).
48. Id. at 50.
49. Id. at 39.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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when identifying immigration cases.53 This task is not as forthright as it
may initially appear. While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)54
seems like the ideal place to start, this body of law is a dense and
convoluted morass of statutes known for its “fiendish complexity.”55
While all laws comprise portions of a larger complex system,56
immigration law is considered particularly unwieldy.57 The INA contains
a plethora of provisions ranging from those related to admission to the
United States58 and deportation from the United States,59 to protections
against workplace discrimination,60 statistical reporting requirements for
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),61 restrictions on
employers,62 and limitations on eligibility for state and local public
benefits.63
Given the range of subject areas covered in what are ostensibly labeled
“immigration laws,” jurists and immigration scholars have developed
various lexica for categorizing laws within the “immigration” label.
These efforts are often necessary to discern the precise legal and
constitutional constraints that apply to these statutes. For example,

53. See, e.g., Raso & Eskridge Jr., supra note 23 at 1175–76 (categorizing immigration law
cases as “highly normative” with no discussion of what constitutes “immigration case”); see
generally Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 20 (omitting any discussion of what qualifies as an
“immigration case”).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
55. Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Zeqiri v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d
364, 370 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing the INA as “Byzantine”); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253
(3rd Cir. 2006) (characterizing immigration regulations as “labyrinthine”); Baltazar-Alcazar v.
Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is no wonder we have
observed ‘[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed second
only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is often the only person who could
thread the labyrinth.’”); Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“This case vividly
illustrates the labyrinthine character of modern immigration law—a maze of hyper-technical
statutes and regulations that engender waste, delay, and confusion for the Government and
petitioners alike.”); Chi Thon Ngo v. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 192 F.3d 390, 394 (3rd Cir.
1999) (“[T]he Immigration Act has never been a model of clarity . . . .”).
56. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909,
962 (2013) (“Legal systems are complex adaptive systems with elaborate levels of complexity and
extensive feedback loops between their respective institutions and agents as well as outside
institutions and agents.”).
57. See, e.g., Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 425–26 (2018) (“The nature of law is, in general, a complex system of rules and applications.
Immigration law in particular is widely considered ‘labyrinthine,’ ‘a maze of hyper-technical
statutes and regulations.’”).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1380.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
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immigration law scholars frequently categorize immigration statutes into
two broad and somewhat unwieldy subcategories for the purposes of
discussing constitutional implications of various statutes.64 The first
category, sometimes referred to as selection rules, govern the rights of
noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States.65 These
immigration selection laws are differentiated from the second category,
alienage rules, which regulate the treatment of noncitizens inside the
United States.66 While some immigration scholars are critical of this
schema for categorizing immigration laws, this dichotomy persists as an
organizing principle in the academic literature67 and in the
jurisprudence.68 Based on colloquial understandings of the terms, one can
speculate that the term “immigration law” as used by empiricists includes
both selection rules and alienage rules.69
An alternative model for analyzing immigration cases has emerged in
recent years that focuses on the Court’s deference jurisprudence to
categorize immigration cases. In a 2019 article, Professor Michael Kagan
proposed a framework for categorizing immigration cases premised on
the physical liberty interest of the noncitizen at issue in the litigation.70
64. Kagan, supra note 13, at 512–13 (“Immigration law has long recognized a significant
constitutional difference for noncitizens who are already in the United States and those who are
trying to enter. When the government takes action against a person who is inside the country, the
foreign policy implications are more attenuated.”).
65. Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law”, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 193–94
(2016); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 360–61
(2008).
66. Lindsay, supra note 65, at 193–94 (explaining alienage rules); Cox, supra note 65, at 351–
53 (discussing the role of alienage rules); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage,
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202–03 (1994) (highlighting the elusive
line between alienage and immigration rules).
67. Cox, supra note 65, at 357 (2008) (challenging this distinction between immigrant-selecting
rules and other rules); Motomura, supra note 66, at 202 (“The line between “immigration” and
“alienage” is elusive . . . . One key reason is functional overlap. “Alienage” rules may be surrogates
for “immigration” rules. Often, the intended and/or actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect
immigration patterns.”).
68. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407, 2409–12, 2414–15 (2018) (discussing
the president’s authority to impose entry restrictions as an extension of the federal government’s
plenary power to exclude); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (holding that a Texas statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying aliens the
opportunity to become notaries public); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954) (addressing
the Court’s limited role in reviewing statutes restricting entry of aliens and their right to remain in
the United States); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—
to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (extending the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
protections to a San Francisco ordinance that, although race-neutral on its face, discriminated
against Chinese immigrant laborers in the United States).
69. See, e.g., Raso & Eskridge Jr., supra note 23, at 1735–41 (using the term “immigration law”
when talking about both selection and alienage rules); Eskridge Jr. & Baer, supra note 23, at 1098–
1120 (analyzing both selection and alienage rules).
70. Kagan, supra note 13, at 532–34 (describing the categorization method).
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Accordingly, Kagan reviewed thirty-five years of Supreme Court
opinions and identified cases where Chevron was or should have been
considered.71 Once he identified these cases, he then organized them into
four categories.72 While not an empirical analysis, Kagan concluded that
cases raising issues related to noncitizen’s liberty interest, such as
immigration detention and deportation cases,73 are less likely to receive
Chevron deference from the Court than immigration cases that do not
raise these concerns, such as non-removal cases.74 Kagan argues this
tiered system for applying Chevron in immigration cases is due to the
Court’s historical devotion to protecting physical liberty as a sacrosanct
constitutional value.75
Kagan’s analytical framework plays a foundational role in this Article,
as does the academic literature discussing the overlap between civil
immigration and criminal statutes. In recent decades, courts have
recognized the increasing incorporation of criminal law elements into
ostensibly civil immigration statutes.76 Noncitizens with criminal
convictions, or, in some instances, merely suspected of certain criminal
behavior,77 may be found removable and barred from requesting various
forms of relief in immigration proceedings.78 Immigration remains
primarily a civil body of law,79 but the incorporation of these criminal
71. Id. at 512–43.
72. Id.
73. Removal proceedings in Immigration Court proceed in two stages: the first stage requires
an immigration court to determine whether or not an individual is subject to removal. If the
individual is found to be subject to removal, the immigration judge will then proceed to the second
stage and consider possible forms of relief. Id. at 537. It appears that Kagan refers to primarily to
the first stage in these proceedings when he discusses “deportation cases” where the Court is
recalcitrant to apply Chevron. See Id. at 522–33 (discussing the first stage of cases). Later in his
article, Kagan addresses the interpretations that arise in the second stage of these removal
proceedings, where he finds that the court has compunction about applying Chevron. Id. at 537–
39. While the label “deportation case” can arguably apply to both stages of these removal
proceedings, it appears that Kagan limits this category to the first stage and not the latter.
74. Id. at 512–39 (describing non-removal cases). See also Das, supra note 13, at 180–91
(contending that nondelegation principles are strongest in cases that involve habeas review of
immigration detention).
75. Kagan, supra note 13, at 532 (“Much like imprisonment, this kind of deprivation of physical
liberty calls for strong checks and balances between the judiciary and the executive branches, which
makes judicial deference to administrative interpretations of the law especially indefensible. As the
Court has said in a different context, deprivation of physical liberty ‘is a penalty different in kind.’”)
(quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979)).
76. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–64 (2010) (reviewing the history of statutory
immigration reforms over the last century).
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(C)–(I), (3) (outlining criminal convictions, including suspicion,
and removal procedures).
78. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (outlining criminal convictions and removal procedures,
including who can be deported).
79. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A
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elements into this body of law has, on occasion, caused the Supreme
Court to qualify this treatment of immigration as civil.80 This increasing
interconnectedness between civil immigration and criminal statutes has
led to the bleeding of legal conventions from one area into the other. One
notable example of this exchange is the rule of lenity, a well-established
canon of construction in the criminal law context, which requires a
reviewing court resolve any statutory ambiguity in an immigration statute
in favor of a noncitizen.81 Since the government interest in adversarial
removal hearings often runs counter to the interest of the noncitizen, the
rule of lenity frequently applies the statutory interpretation disfavored by
the government.82 This canon of construction operates as a kind of antideference by requiring the reviewing court to interpret statutory
ambiguity in the manner most favorable to the noncitizen.83 The Court
has yet to formally address how these two contradictory regimes can
coexist within immigration law.84
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not
to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a
crime.”).
80. See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66 (“Although removal proceedings are civil in nature,
deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And, importantly, recent
changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction
in the deportation context.”) (internal citations omitted). See also Immigr. & Naturalization Servs.
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“We find these ordinary canons of statutory
construction compelling, even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”); Immigr. & Naturalization
Servs. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat.
310 (2005), as recognized in Balogun v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2005); Slocum,
supra note 13, at 519–23 (discussing the Supreme Court’s long history of construing immigration
statutes narrowly in favor of noncitizens in certain circumstances); Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of
Nondeference: Chevron and Deportation for a Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 350 (2018)
(describing similarities between immigration and criminal cases).
81. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Even if § 16 lacked clarity on this point,
we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor. Although
here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal
and noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we
encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”).
82. Kagan, supra note 13, at 542–43 (discussing the preferences of the government versus
citizens).
83. Slocum, supra note 13, at 517 (“Notwithstanding this recent reference, the role of the
immigration rule of lenity in deportation proceedings is not clear due to the competing deference
doctrine announced in the now-famous case Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. . . . One important issue left unresolved by the Court is the role of canons of
construction in the review of agency interpretations.”).
84. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“We have no need to resolve
whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the statute, read in
context, unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity
nor Chevron applies.”). See also Family, supra note 13, at 118 (discussing the Supreme Court
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Professor Kagan elaborates a framework for reviewing Supreme Court
cases that turns on the liberty interest, if any, at issue in the litigation. For
instance, Zadvydas v. Davis is one notable example of the Court’s
apprehension when reviewing cases where an individual’s liberty interest
is implicated. In Zadvydas, two immigrant detainees challenged the
government’s authority to detain them indefinitely after immigration
officials were unable to deport them to their countries of citizenship
during the statutory removal period.85 At issue was whether the INA
authorized the continued—and potentially indefinite—detention of an
individual whose removal order the U.S. government could not
effectuate.86 The Court rejected the government’s invocation of the
plenary power doctrine and held that it did not authorize the indefinite
detention of immigrants under order of deportation.87 The Court declined
the government’s invitation to defer to its interpretation due to the
constitutional concerns arising from indefinite detention.88 In its
reasoning, the Court distinguished between the government’s authority to
detain immigrants and its authority to regulate admission or removal from
the country; protect national security; or determine foreign policy, for
which the Court suggested deference was appropriate.89 Noncitizens’
prolonged detention, the Court concluded, was squarely within the realm
of constitutionally protected areas where the judiciary did not defer to
agency interpretations.90 In Zadvydas, the Court appeared to invert the
Chevron standard and apply a kind of anti-deference, despite the plenary
powers issue in the case. Upon considering the statutory language of the
statute, the Court found congressional intent ambiguous.91 While a strict
adherence to Chevron would dictate that the Court then defer to a
reasonable agency interpretation of the statute in this situation, the Court
instead applied the canon of constitutional avoidance.92 During the 2018
term, the Court revisited the canon of constitutional avoidance in another
immigration detention case, wherein the Court limited the circumstances
decision in Esquival-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1562, wherein the Supreme Court side stepped any
discussion of whether Chevron or the Rule of Lenity took priority).
85. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–86 (2001).
86. Id. at 683.
87. Id. at 682 (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category
would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit
“reasonable time” limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.”).
88. Id. at 696–97 (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)).
89. Id. at 695–96.
90. Id. at 696.
91. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697.
92. Id. at 699 (“[I]nterpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat, we conclude
that, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute.”). See also Das, supra note 13, at 155–56 (dissecting the Court’s decision
in Zadvydas).
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under which the canon of constitutional avoidance can be applied.93
Immigration scholars have attempted to make sense of the Supreme
Court’s seemingly incongruous jurisprudence in a variety of ways. While
the Supreme Court has not expressly articulated any one framework for
delimiting Chevron’s role in immigration cases, unspoken elements of
the Court’s reasoning appear in the gaps left by the Court’s decisions.
Much like immigration scholars, courts of appeals judges have also
attempted to read the Supreme Court tea leaves and developed a variety
of approaches to incorporate these conflicting lessons into their own
opinions.94 These attempts to divine meaning have resulted in starkly
different results across the circuits as well as across categories of
immigration law.95
II. OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDY
While the Supreme Court is certainly the final arbiter of these matters,
courts of appeals play a central role in shaping the administrative
landscape in which all administrative decisions are reviewed.96 For this
reason, this study analyzes courts of appeals’ application of Chevron in
immigration cases to examine how these appellate courts have attempted
to discern the Supreme Court’s seemingly discordant precedent on the
matter. This Article adapts a data set of courts of appeals’ decisions
compiled by Professors Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker. In contrast
with the original Barnett-Walker study, this study exclusively considers
agency interpretations of immigration statutes in order to identify
relevant variables that shape the courts’ applications of Chevron. This
Article groups the immigration cases collected in the Barnett-Walker
study into subcategories and codes for additional variables unique to
immigration cases that influence the courts’ review.
A. Barnett-Walker Data Set of Chevron in the Courts of Appeal
In 2017, Professors Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker published a
study examining courts of appeals’ application of Chevron in
immigration cases generally.97 The data they compiled for this is one of
93. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842–44 (2018).
94. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the findings of this empirical study).
95. Id.
96. Lawson & Kam, supra note 25, at 42–69 (describing the DC Circuit’s embrace of Chevron
as the catalyst for the precedent’s emergence as a foundational precedent in the modern
administrative state). See also Kagan, supra note 13, at 497 (“[T]here is a plausible case that we
should really be talking about the General Motors Doctrine, in honor of the 1984 DC Circuit en
banc decision that seems have been the first to cite and explain Chevron as a major change in
administrative law.”).
97. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 5 (“This article presents the findings of the
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the most comprehensive data sets of Chevron precedent98 and would
serve as the basis for multiple subsequent studies by the duo.99 The
original Barnett-Walker data set identified 2,272 courts of appeals
decisions, between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2013, that discuss
Chevron in the course of reviewing an agency interpretation.100 These
eleven years were chosen because they were far enough from the original
Chevron decision and subsequent progeny that courts of appeals had
become accustomed to the deference landscape.101 In contrast to similar
empirical studies, which have reviewed data sets limited to a single circuit
court,102 a particular agency,103 or an abbreviated timeframe,104 the
Barnett-Walker study reviews appellate cases from across multiple
circuits and agencies from an eleven-year period.105
largest empirical study of Chevron in the circuit courts to determine how Chevron works outside
the marbled enclave of One First Street.”).
98. Id. at 5 (“This Article presents the findings of the largest empirical study of Chevron in the
circuit courts to determine how Chevron works outside the marbled enclave of One First Street.
Our database of 2,272 judicial decisions, collected with broad search parameters, attempts to cull
all published decisions from the circuit courts over an eleven-year period (2003–2013) that refer to
the Chevron doctrine.”).
99. See Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, supra note 15, at 1486 (employing the
original Barnett-Walker data set to evaluate the political dynamics of appellate panels on Chevron’s
application); Chevron Step Two’s Domain, supra note 15, at 1458 (employing the original BarnettWalker data set to evaluate how circuit courts have applied Chevron step two to invalidate agency
statutory interpretations).
100. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 5 (“Our database of 2,272 judicial
decisions collected with broad search parameters, attempts to cull all published decisions from the
circuit courts over an eleven-year period (2003–2013) that refer to the Chevron doctrine.”).
101. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 21–22 (noting that the timing ensured that
courts of appeals had time to incorporate Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) and
Barnhart v. Wilson, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) into their jurisprudence).
102. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1122–
38 (2001) (reviewing DC Circuit decisions from 1970 to 1996); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H.
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–76 (1998) (reviewing over 200 opinions from the
DC Circuit between 1991 and 1995 that cited Chevron); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence
of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303–07 (surveying a set of administrative law cases
in the DC Circuit).
103. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006) (analyzing Supreme Court
decisions regarding the NLRB and EPA from 1990 to 2004).
104. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 4 (1998) (considering cases from 1995
to 1996); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 989–90 (reviewing nearly 2,500 decisions,
including those without published opinions, in six- or two-month periods during certain years to
ascertain Chevron’s effect on judicial review).
105. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 21 (discussing the Barnett-Walker study’s
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In addition to advancing the study of courts of appeals’ application of
Chevron, generally, the breadth of the Barnett-Walker data set makes it a
particularly useful resource to analyze courts of appeals’ application of
Chevron in immigration cases.106 Immigration cases comprised nearly
one-third (30.6%) of the total data set, by far the largest single legal area
within the study.107 The overrepresentation of immigration cases comes
as little surprise since immigration law is one of the most litigated areas
of administrative law.108
One notable finding in the Barnett-Walker studies is the idiosyncratic
manner in which courts of appeals apply Chevron in immigration cases.
Barnett and Walker note the distorting effect that these immigration cases
have on the data overall. For instance, in the first article in their series,
Barnett and Walker consider agency win rates when formal
adjudications—a category that includes BIA decisions—produce the
statutory interpretation at issue.109 Barnett and Walker found that
agency’s interpretation succeeded in 74.7% of the entries that arose from
these formal adjudications.110 This overall rate of success, however,
would increase ten percentage points when immigration cases were
methods and indicating the difference and thorough nature compared to previous studies); see also
Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, supra note 15, at 1486–91 (detailing the thorough
method and numerous variables used in the Barnett-Walker study).
106. One should note that the current study does not capture significant developments in
immigration law after 2013. For instance, the Trump Administration engaged in a massive project
of restructuring immigration agencies, regulations, and precedent. See, e.g., A-B-, 27 I&N Dec.
316, 345–46 (A.G. 2018) (refusing to grant asylum to an alien who had suffered domestic abuse);
L-E-A, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 47 (BIA 2017) (finding that membership of a social group comprised of
the petitioner’s father’s family members was insufficient to grant asylum); Inadmissibility on
Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,296–97 (Aug. 14, 2019) (proposing a change to
the method by which DHS will determine whether to admit an alien to the United States). See also
Lisa Riordan Seville & Adiel Kaplan, AG Barr Using Unique Power to Block Migrants From U.S.,
Reshape
Immigration
Law,
NBC
NEWS
(July
31,
2019,
3:30
AM),
www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/ag-barr-using-unique-power-to-blockmigrants-from-us-reshape-immigration-law/105391/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ3X-AP4T] (describing
the unprecedented pace at which Attorneys General Sessions and Barr have certified immigration
cases to themselves rather than relying on the administrative review of the BIA). Nevertheless,
while the pace of these restructuring efforts has substantially increased in recent years, the
deferential framework under which these court of appeals review these cases remains largely
unchanged.
107. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 27 (“As for subject matter, 30.6% of
interpretations concerned immigration, perhaps explaining in part the Ninth Circuit’s
disproportionate share of the interpretations in the dataset.”); see also Administrative Law’s
Political Dynamics, supra note 15, at 1490 (finding 29% of entries were coded as “immigration”
cases).
108. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 104, at 1015–16 (noting that in 1990 “immigration cases,
which comprised only 5.4% of the [courts of appeals’] caseload in 1965, now account for 13.7%
and comprise the third largest group of cases (after the NLRB and MSPB cases).”).
109. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 36, 39 (comparing agency win rates by
agency procedure).
110. Id.
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omitted from the analysis.111 The immigration cases’ distorting effect
was also observed in the rate at which courts concluded that Chevron
controlled (i.e., passed Chevron step zero).112 Agency interpretations
arising from formal adjudications jumped from 76.7% to 85.2% when
immigration adjudications were excluded.113 In both instances, the
authors excised these immigration cases in order to achieve “closer
parity” with the remaining cases.114
In their attempt to catalog courts of appeals’ application of Chevron,
Barnett and Walker created a rich data set for considering Chevron
jurisprudence holistically but did not examine the individual legal subject
areas with equal depth. This is most notable in the immigration cases
where the duo relied on a generalized category of “immigration” cases
that omit key nuances and distinct characteristics of an area of
administrative law that plays an outsized role in administrative
decisions.115 This study seeks to remedy that.
B. Study Design, Methodology, and Data Set
This section reviews the methodology used to compile the original
Barnett-Walker data set and explains the additions made by this Article.
Barnett and Walker identified all cases where Chevron was cited or
discussed by the court of appeals panel, regardless of whether it actually
applied the decision.116 Given the sheer size of the endeavor, Barnett and
111. Id. (noting immigration interpretations arising from formal adjudications rose to 84.7%
when immigration cases were omitted).
112. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court held that Chevron was appropriate only in cases
where “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law . . . .” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). Following this decision,
jurists and scholars referred to this initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies in
the case as “Chevron step zero.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191
(2006) (defining “Chevron step zero” as the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework
applies).
113. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 36, 39 (indicating Chevron deference rates
for formal adjudication with and without immigration adjudications).
114. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 6–7 (discussing the differences in Chevron
deference rates for different types of adjudication and what benefits arise when immigration
adjudication is omitted).
115. “Immigration” cases constituted 462 out of the 1575 entries in the original Barnett-Walker
data set. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 27 (Immigration cases comprised 30.6%
of the Barnett-Walker data set, which is a notable feat given that immigration cases are entirely
absent from the Federal Circuit cases and almost entirely absent from the DC Circuit cases included
in the data set.). Int’l Internship Program v. Napolitano, 718 F.3d 986 (D.C. Cir. 2013) was the only
DC Circuit case in the Barnett-Walker data set related to immigration. Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd
& Christopher J. Walker, Index of Barnett-Boyd-Walker Vanderbilt Law Review 2018 (Feb. 2,
2019), http://clboyd.net/BarnettBoydWalker_Vand2018/ [https://perma.cc/M5B3-KJZG].
116. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 22 n.140 (“[O]ther studies generally coded
only cases that applied the Chevron framework, while we coded all cases that concerned statutory
interpretation and referred to Chevron, whether or not the court applied the Chevron framework.”).
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Walker found that traditional methods of collecting relevant cases—such
as searching for all instances of judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations—were unfeasible.117 Instead, Barnett and Walker
collected cases through a series of keyword Westlaw searches that
combined “Chevron” with a qualifying search term such as “agency,”
“ALJ,” “order,” “formal adjudication,” “rule,” or “interpretation.”118
These searches were coupled with additional searches for federal
agencies they believed were most likely to engage in statutory
interpretation.119 The final Barnett-Walker database included data from
cases that engaged in both direct and collateral review of agency
interpretations.120 Once the list of cases was compiled, researchers then
reviewed the list to remove duplicates, unpublished decisions, and other
irrelevant authorities.121
Once the data had been scraped, Professors Barnett and Walker coded
thirty-seven distinct variables related to the nature of the decisions,
including nature of the judicial decision, subject matter, political valence
of the interpretation, and result for the agency.122 They described this
process as follows:
Our research assistants initially reviewed the decisions, and we then
completed a secondary review of every decision to increase uniformity
and validity. In our secondary review, we divided the cases up randomly
for one of us to review, and we flagged cases for a third-level review
where the other then weighed in. One of us then conducted a more
systemic review of the cases in preparing the data set for analysis in the
IBM SPSS statistics software. For all decisions with at least one
instance of an agency’s statutory interpretation of a statute that it
administers, we coded each instance of interpretation within one case
as its own entry (as Kerr, Re, and Hickman and Krueger did, but
Eskridge and Baer did not), meaning that one decision could have more
than one entry in our data set. We had a total of 1,558 separate instances
of statutory interpretation from 1,327 judicial opinions.123

While thorough, this approach is not without limitations, as both
Barnett and Walker acknowledge. First, Barnett and Walker’s strategy of
using keyword searches to identify and filter cases relied on multiple
layers of human review. Review of the data set for this Article uncovered
a handful of cases that appeared to satisfy the researchers’ parameters for
inclusion but were nevertheless omitted from the ultimate Barnett117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
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Walker data set.124 While Barnett and Walker used multiple strategies for
identifying published federal courts of appeals’ decisions, the authors
note that the data set is imperfect.125
A second limitation with Barnett and Walker’s approach is a structural
one related to the limitations of relying on a keyword search. By
identifying cases using keyword searches that include “Chevron,” this
data set omits cases where appellate courts fail to include any reference
to Chevron. This may occur in a number of situations. For instance,
Chevron is well established precedent that has been formally accepted
and applied in every circuit over the past thirty-five years. Given its
longstanding tenure, courts of appeals have developed their own
precedent and language for administering Chevron two-step deference
standard within their own circuit. Chevron has become so enmeshed in
the jurisprudence that courts may also cite Chevron’s Supreme Court or
circuit court progeny in lieu of the eponymous case.126 Conversely, the
Barnett-Walker method of scraping data also omits cases where the courts
silently omit any reference to Chevron, despite the precedent control.127
Professor Michael Kagan observed that the Supreme Court frequently
engaged in such omissions, which he labeled “soft” anti-Chevron
decisions in his 2018 article reviewing the Supreme Court’s application
of Chevron in immigration cases.128 These soft anti-Chevron decisions
124. Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 115. The missing cases include Singh v. Gonzales,
432 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2006); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2007); Guo Qi Wang v.
Holder, 583 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2009); Ganzhi v. Holder, 624 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010); Diouf v.
Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008) (subsequent appeal included in the original data set); and
Mei Juan Zheng v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). The total number of missing
cases remains unclear; however, these omissions are not fatal for the purposes of this study.
125. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 22 (“Although our data set does not permit
us to paint as complete a picture as to non-Chevron regimes as the Eskridge and Baer or Hickman
and Krueger studies, we anticipated obtaining a sufficient number of applications to inform
understandings of those doctrines.”).
126. See, e.g., Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1185 (11th Cir. 2004) rather than Chevron); Duron-Ortiz v. Holder,
698 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2012), as amended (Nov. 6, 2012) (citing Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d
758, 763 (7th Cir. 2005)); Sanchez v. Holder, 627 F.3d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Immigr. &
Naturalization Servs. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999)); Marroquin-Ochoma v.
Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing De Brenner v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 629, 636 (8th
Cir. 2004)); Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing White v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Servs., 75 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1996)). Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 115.
127. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 48–52 (comparing outcomes of cases that
use or do not use the Chevron framework).
128. See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1992)
(providing an example of a case omitting any named reference to Chevron); Anti-Chevron
Decisions, supra note 46, at 40 (defining “soft” anti-Chevron opinions as those cases where the
Court either fails to apply the precedent when it ostensibly should have mattered or flippantly
dismisses the precedent so as to render it irrelevant in the interpretation under consideration); see
also id. (defining “loud” anti-Chevron opinions as those which explicitly address the precedent and
articulate doctrinal justifications for not applying the precedent in the particular circumstances).
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present a significant challenge for data collection related to the courts’
application of, or failure to apply, Chevron in cases where it should apply.
Barnett and Walker acknowledge this limitation in their methodology,
which does not attempt to identify either category of these cases.129 Thus,
despite their careful attempts, the Barnett-Walker data set is an inherently
imperfect one.
Nevertheless, the Barnett-Walker data set provides the most
comprehensive accounting of courts of appeals Chevron decisions in
recent years and captures an invaluable, though limited, snapshot of the
immigration-Chevron precedent. The Barnett-Walker data set is
especially valuable for this Article because it follows a period of
significant restructuring of the U.S. immigration enforcement agencies.
The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which houses both
the immigration courts and the BIA, adopted a series of structural reforms
intended to reduce the backlog of immigration cases. Beginning in 1999,
the EOIR changed its regulations to empower the BIA to issue single-line
summary affirmances of immigration court decisions.130 At the same
time, the BIA drastically reduced the number of precedential decisions it
issued in practice.131 In 2002, the BIA continued to “streamline” its
review procedures and edited case management regulations to expand the
authority of individual board members. The new regulations reduced the
number of cases requiring BIA panel review and expanded the authority
of individual board members to summarily dispose of appeals.132
Individual board members could now choose between two options to
readily dispose of an appeal: (1) affirm immigration judge rulings without
opinion;133 or (2) issue brief, written opinions affirming, modifying, or

129. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 29 (“This study looked only at decisions
in which courts cited Chevron deference, so it is no doubt far from a complete picture of the
Skidmore and no-deference precedent in the circuit courts.”); id. at 23 n.144 (“Similar to another
study, we did not attempt to obtain decisions in which the courts should have applied Chevron but
failed to do so or decisions that applied a Chevron-like review without citing Chevron.”).
130. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(4)–(5) (2020). See also Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural
Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,309, 7,311 (“A single board member may
summarily affirm without opinion under § 3.1(e)(4). . . .”); Rana, supra note 46, at 327 ([T]he
immigration agency . . . implemented a series of streamlining regulations which allowed the
appellate body at the agency, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), to issue summary
affirmances of an Immigration Judge’s decision . . . .”).
131. Rana, supra note 46, at 329 (“[A]s it increasingly issued affirmances without opinion, the
Board also drastically reduced the number of precedential decisions it issued . . .”).
132. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6) (2020) (listing the criteria for immigration court appeals that
warrant review by a BIA panel).
133. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (“The Board Member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the
decision of the Service or the immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board member determines
that the result reached in the decision under review was correct . . . .”).
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remanding the lower court’s orders.134 These combined reforms at the
turn of the twenty-first century had a profound effect on courts of appeals,
which were then tasked with reviewing the BIA’s decisions.
While the EOIR reforms had the desired effect of empowering the BIA
to dispose of immigration cases more quickly, the quality of the BIA
opinions suffered as a result. Courts of appeals noted this trend with
frustration and frequently commented on these structural changes when
reviewing BIA decisions under the streamlined process. 135 In addition to
an expanding immigration docket, appellate courts had to contend with
abbreviated immigration court decisions that were summarily affirmed or
denied by BIA decisions that added little clarity or insight to the
administrative record. These reforms also empowered the BIA to quickly
dispose of a larger number of cases and thereby shifted the burden of
reviewing immigration appeals to the courts of appeals, which
experienced a 600 percent increase in the number of immigration
appeals.136 The metaphorical pump was primed by 2003 for the increased
onslaught of immigration appeals.
Appellate courts initially expressed skepticism toward these new
regulatory creations. In many cases the court’s skepticism of the
administrative review process prevented them from applying Chevron to
the BIA’s interpretation.137 Many courts reviewing these immigration
134. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5) (“If the Board member to whom an appeal is assigned determines,
upon consideration of the merits, that the decision is not appropriate for affirmance without opinion,
the Board member shall issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under
review . . . .”).
135. See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deference is earned; it is
not a birthright. Repeated egregious failures of the Immigration Court and the Board to exercise
care commensurate with the stakes in an asylum case can be understood, but not excused, as
consequences of a crushing workload that the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government have refused to alleviate.”); Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At
the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the
adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals
and with the defense of the BIA’s asylum decisions in this court by the Justice Department’s Office
of Immigration Litigation . . . The performance of these federal agencies is too often inadequate.
This case presents another depressing example.”); Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.
2004) (“It is not deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration
cases.”). See also Rana, supra note 46, at 326 (quoting a federal judge as saying “[r]epeated
egregious failures of the Immigration Court and Board to exercise care commensurate with the
stakes in an asylum case can be understood, but not excused, as consequences of a crushing
workload that the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have refused to
alleviate.”).
136. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 27 (2006) (statement of Jonathan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., U.S. Dep’t
Just.). See also Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 581, 632–34 (2013) (discussing the effects of the streamlining reforms on courts of appeals’
expertise in administering immigration laws at the expense of EOIR expertise).
137. See, e.g., De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 2010)
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cases relied increasingly on the immigration judge’s opinion rather than
on the BIA’s decisions as the final agency action.138 Some courts have
gone so far as to question whether any deference is appropriate in such
cases,139 or forwent explicitly endorsing a deference regime by reasoning
that the ruling is unaffected by whichever deference standard applies.140
A tenuous consensus eventually emerged that relied on the precedential
(cataloging circuit splits on this question). See also Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255,
1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of
Appeals precedent does not receive Chevron deference); Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57–58
(2d Cir. 2007) (holding an unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its
definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not “promulgated
under [the agency’s] authority to make rules carrying the force of law”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012–14 (9th Cir. 2006) (opining that an
unpublished BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does not receive Chevron
deference). Contra Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (according Chevron
deference to BIA’s streamlined adoption of IJ decision); Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 623
F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing between a BIA summary affirmance and a single
member, nonprecedential difference and noting that Chevron deference applied in the latter
circumstance); Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2007),
abrogated by, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (“Though we ordinarily grant deference . . .
to the BIA’s construction of the immigration laws, we do not extend Chevron deference to any
statutory construction of the INA set forth in a summarily affirmed IJ opinion, like the one in this
case.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
138. See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (“When the BIA issues
a short opinion adopting an IJ’s decision, we review the two decisions together, including the
portions [of the IJ’s decision] not explicitly discussed by the BIA.”) (internal quotations omitted);
Kepilino v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When, as here, the BIA affirms the
IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency action.”); Yong Wong
Park v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 472 F.3d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision
without opinion, pursuant to its streamlining regulations, rendering the IJ’s decision the final
agency determination.”); Markovski v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 108, 109–10 (4th Cir. 2007) (“When
the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without an opinion, as here, this court reviews the IJ’s decision.”).
139. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A single-member BIA
panel affirmed the IJ’s decision in an unpublished, nonprecedential decision. Such decisions are
entitled to only Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference.”); Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449
F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (“An individual IJ’s statutory interpretation, summarily affirmed by
the BIA under the streamlining procedure, does not, however, result in a statutory interpretation
that carries the ‘force of law.’”).
140. Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 233 n.5 (4th Cir. 2010) (“We need not resolve in this
proceeding whether nonprecedential BIA decisions are entitled to Chevron deference, or merely to
Skidmore deference. As explained below, we would deny the petition for review under the less
deferential standard of Skidmore.”); Mushtaq v. Holder, 583 F.3d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We
need not resolve this question, because Mushtaq’s claim fails under either standard. Thus, we
review it under the less-deferential Skidmore standard.”); Guo Qi Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 90
n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (“While we have not yet decided whether unpublished, single-member BIA
decisions are entitled to the lesser form of deference described in Skidmore, we need not consider
the issue here as we would reach the same result reviewing this petition de novo.”) (citations
omitted); Godinez–Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We need not address
it here, as we hold that even applying the lesser Skidmore deference, we affirm the persuasive BIA
decision.”); De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 351 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because it
was not briefed, barely argued, and is not dispositive for the issues before us, we decline to resolve
this question. For the reasons that follow, we hold that under any standard of review, we cannot
grant Petitioners relief.”).

204

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

value ascribed to the BIA decisions; courts of appeals concluded that
unpublished, single-member BIA opinions do not have precedential value
and do not bind the BIA.141 Conversely, published BIA opinions, whether
from a single board member or panel, were deemed to constitute final
agency actions entitled to deference. Regardless of how the BIA decision
is produced, whether by a panel or by a single member, most circuits
apply or withhold Chevron deference based on whether the BIA intended
the decision to have precedential value.142 The fact that a BIA opinion
was issued by a single board member does not prevent the BIA decision
from carrying the force of law.143
The Barnett-Walker data set presents a treasure trove of data about
courts of appeals’ decisions in immigration cases because it captures a
period of rapid change in their immigration dockets. These structural
reforms within the EOIR combined to create a new legal landscape in
immigration law that significantly altered both the nature and volume of
cases under review by courts of appeals. Given the judiciary’s penchant
for rewarding agency formality with deference, reforms that significantly
altered the quality of the consideration of immigration cases had the
potential to alter the court’s application of Chevron deference in
subsequent immigration cases.144
C. Capturing Emissions: Modifications to the Data Set
In order to test the courts’ application of Chevron across various areas
of immigration, this study adapted the categories used by Professor
Kagan in his study of immigration cases before the Supreme Court.145
141. Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In light of Mead, the
‘essential factor’ in determining whether an agency action warrants Chevron deference is its
precedential value.”).
142. See, e.g., Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e do not
extend Chevron deference to non-precedential Board decisions that do not rely on binding board
precedent . . . [R]ather, such Board decisions are entitled only to Skidmore deference.”) (internal
citations omitted); Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We apply Chevron
deference to the Board’s interpretations of ambiguous immigration statutes, if the Board’s decision
is a published decision.”) (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009));
Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is undisputed that the BIA’s unpublished
decision in this case is not precedential within the agency. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (outlining the
procedure for creating published BIA precedent). Nonetheless, Chevron deference may apply to a
nonprecedential BIA decision if it relies on prior BIA precedent addressing the same question.”)
(citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) (treating a single member
BIA decision as decision by the board that is entitled to Chevron deference).
144. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 12–13 (discussing the role of formality in
Supreme Court opinions from Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) through Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 104, at 1021 (finding agencies that
relied more heavily on adjudication had an affirmance rate of 80% whereas agencies that relied less
heavily on adjudication had an affirmance rate of 86%).
145. Kagan, supra note 13, at 491 (showing the categories adapted for the study).
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Kagan categorized immigration cases into four subcategories: nonremoval, criminal grounds of removal, immigration detention, and relief
from removal.146 He concluded these variables influenced when and how
the Court applied or failed to apply Chevron in immigration cases.147
Kagan concluded Supreme Court justices appeared reticent to apply
Chevron in cases that included issues related to the government’s
restriction of individuals’ physical liberty, such as cases challenging
immigration detention.148 He also found that the Court was less likely to
apply Chevron in cases challenging the criminal grounds of removal.149
Conversely, he concluded that the Court was more willing to adopt
Chevron in cases where there was no restriction on physical liberty at
issue, such as in non-removal cases.150
This study applies similar categories to the immigration cases included
in the Barnett-Walker data set in order to determine whether similar
factors shaped courts of appeals’ application of Chevron. To this end, this
Article filtered the original Barnett-Walker data set by issue area to create
a data set tracking solely the immigration cases collected in the original
Barnett-Walker study. The immigration cases were then categorized and
coded using the following variables:
• Crimmigration: Statutory interpretation in these cases concerns
the immigration consequences of prior criminal conviction and
requires the court to apply either the categorical or modified
categorical approach. The categorical approach requires that
courts consider the elements of a particular crime under federal
law, and then compare these elements to those required for
conviction under the criminal statute.151 In instances where the
146. Id. at 517–31 (illustrating the four categories adapted for the study); id. at 533–39
(discussing immigration beyond deportation).
147. Id. at 519–20 (describing how the Court has grown to increasingly apply Chevron in nonremoval cases after an initial “false start”).
148. Id. at 533–35 (explaining the Supreme Court has heard fewer cases regarding the detention
of immigrants than cases related to deportation of immigrants).
149. Id. at 522–31 (discussing the Supreme Court’s handling of immigration cases concerning
both immigration and criminal law).
150. Kagan, supra note 13, at 517–22 (explaining immigration cases that do not intersect with
the criminal law were more likely to be heard by the Supreme Court). Id. at 537–539 (explaining
that the Supreme Court has been more willing to apply Chevron in relief for removal cases). Kagan
observes that “relief from removal” cases are treated by the Court as though they do not implicate
a physical liberty interest—he attempts to articulate a reason for the Court’s relative comfort in
applying Chevron in these cases, but he is not convinced of his own suggested reasoning, at least
as it applies to asylum cases. Id. at 539 (“I argue that the Supreme Court should treat the
interpretation of asylum eligibility as it does grounds of removability.”). It appears that the physical
liberty framework does not adequately capture the dynamics at play in these cases.
151. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990) (“Thus, Congress intended that the
enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified elements, not by crimes that
happened to be labeled ‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by the laws of the State of conviction.”).
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court reviews divisible criminal statutes, it applies what has been
termed the “modified categorical approach,” which is a variation
on the categorical approach.152 This category also includes cases
where the court must determine the proper classification for a
criminal statute under the “circumstance-specific” approach,
articulated by the Court in Nijhawan v. Holder.153 While this
classification does not include other immigration cases with
criminal elements, such as cases involving immigration statutes
where no conviction is required,154 it does include cases related to
mandatory detention where the reviewing court must apply the
categorical or modified categorical approach.155
Removal: Statutory interpretation in these cases relates to an
individual who was found removable in immigration proceedings
and requested some form of relief. This does not include cases
where the eligibility for relief is contingent on the court’s
application of the categorical or modified categorical approach.
o Asylum Relief: Statutory interpretation in these cases relates
to asylum claims. This includes cases where a reviewing court
must determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
“particularly serious crime[]” without applying the categorical
or modified categorical approach.156
o Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief: Statutory interpretation in
these cases relates to other forms of humanitarian relief
including withholding of removal,157 protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT),158 and the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA).159
Much like asylum, these forms of humanitarian relief
incorporate international obligations into U.S. domestic law.

152. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 284 (2013) (explaining the “modified
categorical approach” and how it is applied).
153. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009) (discussing the “circumstance-specific
approach” and how it is applied).
154. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (discussing controlled substance traffickers).
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (establishing the categories of criminal convictions that trigger the
mandatory detention provision).
156. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (establishing one of the exceptions to granting
asylum to an immigrant).
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (explaining the Attorney General may not remove an immigrant to
a country where their life would be threatened); 8 C.F.R § 208.16 (2020) (discussing withholding
removal under the Convention Against Torture [CAT]).
158. 8 C.F.R §§ 208.16–208.18 (2020) (establishing the withholding of removal under the
CAT); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–1208.18 (2020) (discussing withholding removal and the
implementation of the CAT).
159. Pub. L. 105–100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (establishing eligibility for relief from removal
and deportation under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act).
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Unlike asylum, however, these forms of relief are considered
“broader” because they may remain available in instances
when the individual is rendered ineligible for asylum.
o Miscellaneous Relief: Statutory interpretation concerns any
form of relief from removal not covered in Asylum Relief or
Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief. Such forms of relief
include adjustment of status,160 motions to reopen,161
cancellation of removal,162 and challenges to reinstatement of
removal.163
• Detention: Statutory interpretation relates to statutes authorizing
immigration detention.164
• Non-Removal: Statutory interpretation in these cases concerns
legal issues arising in the context of affirmative immigration
benefits. This category also includes other instances unrelated to
either deportation or detention statutes.
Readers will note that the “Removal” category was further classified
into three sub-subcategories: Asylum, Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief,
and Miscellaneous. The subsidiary categories were created to capture
different outcomes within removal proceedings where the justifications
for Chevron deference vary in strength. For example, scholars have been
critical of the perceived “excessive judicial deference” to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA provisions related to asylum.165 Despite asylum
law’s unique ties to international and human rights law, scholars argue
that Chevron deference has been applied in such a manner that courts
merely view international law—the underpinning of U.S. asylum law—

160. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (explaining how the status of a nonimmigrant can be adjusted to a person
admitted for permanent residence).
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (discussing that an immigrant may file to reopen proceedings).
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (discussing when the Attorney General may cancel removal or adjust
status for certain permanent and nonpermanent residents).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (explaining that the Attorney General may reinstate a removal order
if they discover an alien has illegally reentered the United States after previously being removed or
deported).
164. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (repealed) (discussing judicial review of apprehension and
detention of aliens); § 1231 (discussing provisions for detention and removal of aliens ordered to
be removed); § 1226 (explaining provisions related to apprehension and detention of aliens).
165. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13, at 539 (“I argue that the Supreme Court should treat the
interpretation of asylum eligibility as it does grounds of removability.”); Bassina Farbenblum,
Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron,
60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1064 (2011) (“Throughout the life of the Refugee Act, U.S. courts have been
laboring under the mistaken perception that they are bound, under the Chevron doctrine, to defer
to the BIA’s construction of U.S. refugee statutes, regardless of whether that construction is
consistent with international law. Accordingly, U.S. courts, if they reference it at all, regularly treat
international law as a persuasive, nonbinding guide that is trumped by Chevron deference to a BIA
interpretation, even if that interpretation is inconsistent with international law.”).
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as persuasive and the BIA’s interpretation as binding.166 While asylum
claims frequently accompany claims for other forms of humanitarian
relief, such as withholding of removal and protection from removal under
the CAT, cases that raised multiple humanitarian relief claims were
nevertheless categorized as “Asylum Relief” if the interpretation at issue
was related to asylum, regardless of the presence of other claims.167
In addition to the subcategories listed above, I also coded the
immigration cases for the following variables:
• Country of citizenship: Country where the individual is registered
as a citizen.
• Country of nationality: Place or country of birth.
• Procedural posture: The individual’s procedural posture with
reference to immigration benefits or relief. The posture can be
either “defensive” (cases where federal officials are attempting to
effectuate a noncitizen’s removal) or “affirmative” (where the
initiated proceedings are seeking some immigration benefit).
• Habeas: The appeal arose from a habeas corpus petition filed in
district court.
These latter variables are not analyzed in this Article as they will be
explored further in future studies.
III. FINDINGS ON CHEVRON IN IMMIGRATION CASES
A. Overview of Findings
The revised data set consists of 473 separate instances of statutory
interpretations by circuit courts over the eleven-year period (2003–2013).
In contrast to the Barnett-Walker data set, which found that total instances
of statutory interpretation remained largely consistent over this time
frame, the immigration cases were significantly lower in 2003 and 2004,
the first two years of this study, before swelling to a relatively static
volume in the subsequent years. Overall, there was an average of forty-

166. Farbenblum, supra note 165, at 1064 (“Though deference to agency judgment is sensible
in many areas of statutory interpretation, neither Chevron nor the policies underlying it compel the
lockstep deference that courts afford the BIA’s construction of asylum provisions.”).
167. The decision to distinguish between these three forms of “removal” cases was motivated
by the desire to see if different variables influence the courts’ application of Chevron in these cases.
For example, asylum was categorized separately from other forms of humanitarian relief because
it is subject to the most requirements and disqualifying conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)–(b)
(explaining the authority and conditions for granting asylum). By distinguishing between cases
where asylum or some other form of humanitarian relief is available, I hoped to capture whether
extraneous variables, such as prior conviction history or asylum filing deadlines, influence the
court’s application of Chevron in categories “Asylum Relief” and “Non-Asylum Humanitarian
Relief,” which frequently rely on similar facts and legal arguments to support their respective
claims.
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three immigration interpretations per year.168 Despite a lower sampling
at the beginning of the data set, courts of appeals’ immigration dockets
remained relatively consistent throughout the period under review.
Table 1: Immigration Interpretations Across Circuits
Immigration
Immigration
Interpretations Interpretations
Circuit No.
(n)
(%)
1
25
5.29%
2
83
17.55%
3
81
17.12%
4
27
5.71%
5
34
7.19%
6
16
3.38%
7
34
7.19%
8
18
3.81%
9
111
23.47%
10
15
3.17%
11
28
5.92%
DC
1
0.21%
100%
TOTAL
473
While instances of judicial interpretation remained largely consistent
over the eleven-year period, the instances of statutory interpretation were
not as evenly distributed across immigration classification, formality of
agency interpretation, or circuit. The disparity in review rates across
circuits is quite vast. The Ninth Circuit (23.47%) alone comprises nearly
a quarter of all the entries. When the Ninth Circuit is coupled with the
Second Circuit (17.55%) and Third Circuit (17.12%)—the circuits with
the second and third largest sampling of immigration interpretations in
the data set—these three circuits make up 57.84% of the total data set.
This accords with previous studies that have found the Second, Third, and

168. There were 20 interpretations in 2003, 32 in 2004, 41 in 2005, 52 in 2006, 44 in 2007, 50
in 2008, 45 in 2009, 43 in 2010, 55 in 2011, 47 in 2012, and 44 in 2013. Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, supra note 15, at 27 n.158 (“There were 165 interpretations in 2003, 165 in 2004, 145 in
2005, 145 in 2006, 134 in 2007, 138 in 2008, 132 in 2009, 117 in 2010, 143 in 2011, 129 in 2012,
and 145 in 2013. This does not necessarily mean that the use of Chevron deference has remained
stable over time.”).
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Ninth Circuits hear the largest volume of immigration cases in the
country.169
In contrast to the overall Barnett-Walker data set which included a sizable sample of DC and Federal Circuit opinions (19.7% and 7.9% of the
Barnett-Walker data set, respectively), these circuits are almost entirely
absent from the revised data set.170 This is due to statutes circumscribing
appellate review of orders of removal, which comprise a majority of the
instances of statutory interpretation in the revised data set. The Federal
Circuit lacks subject matter jurisdiction over immigration cases.171 The
remaining federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only those
orders of removal that originated within the geographic confines of the
Federal Circuit and became final.172 Since there are no immigration
courts in the District of Columbia,173 the DC Circuit does not have jurisdiction to review appeals resulting from removal orders. For this reason,
the only immigration-related entry from the DC Circuit in the BarnettWalker data set was a case concerning the Q-1 cultural exchange program.174

169. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295, 362 tbl.2 (2007) (showing that between 2004 and 2005, the Ninth Circuit [2,097],
Second Circuit [451] and Third Circuit [330] far outpaced other circuits in the number of merits
decisions they handed down in asylum related appellate decisions).
170. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 27–28 (discussing an overview of the
study’s dataset).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (explaining the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (explaining the venue and forms requirements to review orders of
removal). See also John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in
Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 21 (2005) (“The current venue rule is that [an
immigration] petition must be filed in the circuit in which the IJ completed proceedings. As a
practical matter, this means that only the First through the Eleventh Circuits have jurisdiction over
petitions for review, since there are no immigration courts located within the territory of the District
of Columbia Circuit. Before April 1, 1997, a petition could be filed in either the circuit in which
the IJ ‘conducted [proceedings] in whole or in part’ or the circuit in which the petitioner resided.”).
173. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirimmigration-court-listing. [https://perma.cc/2BVR-3RTM] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020) (establishing
a list of immigration courts in the United States).
174. See Int’l Internship Program v. Napolitano, 718 F.3d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining
that to participate in the cultural exchange program a foreign citizen must obtain an Q-1 visa).
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Figure 1: Total Immigration Cases by Circuit
8th Cir., 3.8%
7th Cir., 7.2%

9th Cir., 23.5%

10th Cir., 3.2%
11th Cir., 5.9%

6th Cir., 3.4%

DC Cir., 0.2%

5th Cir., 7.2%

1st Cir., 5.3%
4th Cir., 5.7%

3rd Cir., 17.1%

2nd Cir.,
17.5%

Just as the three circuits dominated the revised data set, a handful of
immigration subcategories dominated the data set. As recorded in Table
2, Miscellaneous Relief (50.73%) alone comprises more than half of the
total immigration interpretations contained in the revised data set. When
coupled with the other Removal categories, this section makes up nearly
three-quarters of the total data set (72.34%) and is by far the most
common context in which immigration interpretations are produced.
Since these cases all originate in immigration court and must be appealed
to the BIA before they can be appealed to courts of appeals, the vast
majority of statutory interpretation contained in the revised data set is the
product of BIA adjudications. To this day, BIA adjudications account for
more than eighty-five percent of administrative agency appeals.175

175. U.S. Courts of Appeals – Judicial Business 2018, U.S. CTS. (2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2018
[https://perma.cc/KS4H-8AM4] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (illustrating BIA adjudication
comprised 86 and 85 percent of total administrative agency appeals in 2017 and 2018, respectively).
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Table 2: Immigration Subcategories over Time
Removal

2003
2004

2
0

2
8

0
3

2
4

2
4

12
16

2005
2006

0
0

7
4

1
7

7
11

7
11

22
27

2007
2008

0
4

7
7

2
6

7
10

7
10

27
22

2009
2010

1
0

8
8

6
1

9
7

9
7

18
22

2011
2012

1
1

12
12

2
1

7
9

7
9

32
23

2013

1
10
(2.1%)

11
86
(18.2%)

8
37
(7.8%)

4
77
(16.3%)

4
23
(4.9%)

19
240
(50.7%)

TOTAL

340 (72.34%)

Finally, the vast majority of the interpretations in the current data set
are shaped by removal proceedings. Of the 473 interpretations, 436
(91.97%) arose from litigation where the noncitizen was or had been in
removal proceedings, while only 37 (8.03%) arose when the noncitizen
affirmatively initiated the litigation to pursue some immigration
benefit.176 Similarly, the vast majority of interpretations (81.82%)
originated from formal adjudications by the BIA. This stands in stark
contrast to Barnett and Walker’s findings regarding the method by which
agencies produced their interpretations. Barnett and Walker found that
the agency formats were roughly equally distributed between notice-andcomment rulemaking (36.5%), formal adjudications (36.1%), and
176. Asylum presents a unique form of relief for these purposes. Petitioners may affirmatively
apply for asylum or they may defensively apply for asylum once removal proceedings have
commenced against the individual. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a)–(b) (2020). If an individual affirmatively
applies for asylum but has their application denied by an asylum officer, the asylum officer will
then refer the asylum application to an immigration judge for adjudication in removal proceedings.
8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2020). Thus, asylum applications have the potential to transform from
affirmative to defensive applications. For the purposes of such studies, all cases are categorized
based on the petitioner’s posture at the time of the appellate review. Since denial of affirmative
asylum applications trigger removal proceedings, such cases only result in appellate review after
they have been transformed into removal proceedings.
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informal interpretations (24.8%).177 Federal immigration agencies are an
outlier in their outsize reliance on administrative adjudication as a means
of interpreting immigration statutes. 178
These statistics highlight the idiosyncratic process by which the vast
majority of immigration statutes are interpreted by the federal agencies.
Given the potential adverse results for individuals who face forcible
removal from the United States, it is perhaps of little surprise that
individuals in removal proceedings avidly litigate their cases, which in
turn creates a significant demand on the administrative mechanisms for
adjudicating and reviewing removal cases. Rather than attempt to address
the underlying causes of the ever-increasing volume of immigration
cases, administrative reforms at the turn of the century streamlined the
administrative review process in a way that shifted the burden of
adjudicating these disputes from the agency to the courts of appeals.
B. Chevron Application and Agency Win Rates
Table 3: Chevron Application Rates
Immigration Category
N
Chevron
application rate
Detention
10
50.0% (5)
Crimmigration
86
51.16% (44)
Non-Removal
37
70.27% (26)
Removal
340
75.88% (258)
Asylum Relief
Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief
Miscellaneous Relief

TOTAL

77
23
240

75.32% (58)
78.26% (18)
75.83% (182)

473

70.4% (333)

Once the cases were coded with their respective immigration
classifications, the revised data set reveals stark patterns and practices in
the courts of appeals’ application of Chevron within the broader
immigration context. To this end, the first measurement to consider is the
frequency with which courts concluded that the statute under
consideration was subject to Chevron.179 Of the 473 immigration statute
177. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 28.
178. See Family, supra note 13, at 120 (discussing the BIA’s reliance on adjudication and
guidance documents rather than on agency rulemaking as well as practical obstacles to immigration
agency’s attempts to employ rulemaking).
179. A note of caution: just because a court finds that a statute is subject to Chevron does not
mean that the court proceeded to apply Chevron. This rate of application captures instances where
the court will apply Chevron if it satisfies the additional prerequisites of the opinion, namely that
(1) the statutory language is ambiguous and (2) the agency’s proposed interpretation is reasonable.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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interpretations studied, the circuit courts applied the Chevron framework
in 333 of them (70.4%), a marked but not unprecedented departure from
the Barnett-Walker study, which found that circuit courts applied the
Chevron framework in 74.8% of the global data set.180 If the analysis
ended here, then there would be little reason to believe that courts of
appeals apply Chevron differently in the immigration context than in
other administrative law cases.
It becomes immediately apparent, however, that once the immigration
interpretations are filtered into their respective subcategory, Chevron
controls at wildly different rates. For example, courts of appeals hold that
Chevron applies only in 50% and 51.16% of interpretations classified as
“immigration detention” and “crimmigration,” respectively. This
significantly lowered rate of Chevron application accords with Kagan’s
general findings about the Supreme Court’s hesitance to apply Chevron
deference in these categories of cases.181 Although the Court has yet to
explicitly embrace Kagan’s physical liberty framework for applying
Chevron, courts of appeals appear to have gleaned similar lessons from
the Supreme Court precedent.
The appellate courts’ language reflects their recalcitrance to apply
Chevron in cases involving crimmigration considerations by explicitly
weighing anti-deference principles in their opinions. While most
immigration statutes are considered civil in nature, immigration law in
recent decades has become increasingly entangled with criminal laws,
which frequently trigger removal proceedings or other immigration
consequences. In the crimmigration cases—which require courts to
review both criminal statutes and the immigration statute—courts
frequently employ a rhetoric that is restrictive of any deference and apply
de novo review.182 Courts have also previously reasoned that Chevron
deference does not apply in such cases involving categorical and
modified categorical approaches because the interpretation of federal
statutes is an area where the courts, not the attorney general, have the
relative expertise.183 This latter justification runs directly counter to
Chevron because it draws no meaningful distinction between the attorney
general, and by extension the Department of Justice, and other federal

180. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 32.
181. Kagan, supra note 13, at 522–35.
182. See, e.g., Bobb v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 458 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We
exercise de novo review over the BIA’s conclusion that Bobb’s criminal conviction constitutes an
aggravated felony.”) (citing Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2004)).
183. See, e.g., Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 472 F.3d 66, 71 (3d Cir.
2006) (“[T]he Attorney General has no particular expertise in defining a term under federal law,
yet it is “what federal courts do all the time.”) (quoting Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 251 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
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agencies tasked with interpreting federal statutes.184 Nevertheless, courts
frequently comment on the delicate task of teasing apart these varying
and contradictory principles in their opinions.185 For instance, in
Morales-Garcia v. Holder,186 a Ninth Circuit panel articulated perhaps
the clearest position on how it understood Chevron to apply in cases that
concerned the categorical or modified categorical approach. The panel
partitioned their review of BIA categorical determinations into two parts.
The first part required the appellate court to determine the offense the
petitioner was convicted of committing, which involved interpreting
either state or federal criminal statute.187 Since the BIA has no special
expertise interpreting such statutes, the court held that it is not entitled to
any deference in this step.188 Once the appellate court has determined the
nature of the petitioner’s prior conviction, it then proceeds to step two,
wherein it must determine whether the conviction qualifies as either a
“crime involving moral turpitude” or an “aggravated felony” under the
INA.189 In contrast to the first step, the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA is
entitled to Chevron deference with respect to the latter step in the
analysis.190 This bifurcated analysis for categorical and modified
categorical cases has similarly been adopted by the Fifth Circuit.191 Other
circuits, however, have flattened the deference analysis in categorical and
modified categorical cases and omitted any discussion of the two-step
inquiry articulated by the Ninth Circuit. The First, Third, and Seventh
Circuits maintain that Chevron applies to a courts’ review of the
categorical and modified categorical cases generally without

184. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 858–59 (concerning the Environmental Protection
Agency’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, specifically the portion codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7508).
185. See, e.g., Ng v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e
exercise plenary review over Ng’s legal contention that the use of interstate commerce facilities in
the commission of a murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 is not an aggravated felony.”);
Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The BIA’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 16
is not entitled to deference by this Court: as a federal provision outside the INA, it lies beyond the
BIA’s area of special expertise.”).
186. See generally Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009).
187. Id. at 1061.
188. Id. (“Because the BIA has no special expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in
construing state or federal criminal statutes . . . we review the BIA’s finding regarding the specific
act for which the petitioner was convicted de novo.”).
189. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43).
190. Morales-Garciz, 567 F.3d at 1061.
191. Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, 592 F.3d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In conducting our analysis,
we first review the BIA’s interpretation of the INA itself, including its definition of the INA’s
words and phrases. . . . We then review de novo whether a petitioner’s conviction under a state
statute constitutes an ‘aggravated felony’ and renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal.”)
(internal quotation and citations omitted).
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distinguishing between the multiple steps in these analyses.192
Moreover, in addition to these considerations related to interpreting
criminal statutes, these categorical and modified categorical cases also
raised concerns about the existence of an immigration lenity rule. While
the rule has been deployed by the Court in post-Chevron cases,193 the
immigration lenity rule functions as an anti-deference tool that does not
fit comfortably within the Chevron deference regime.194 Courts have
grappled with this issue in their attempts to determine whether Chevron
applies,195 and the Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule on the
matter.196
While courts of appeals are reluctant to find that Chevron applies in
immigration detention and crimmigration cases, these concerns appear to
dissipate in the remaining areas of immigration law—non-removal and
all three subcategories of removal cases. In fact, the aggregated rate of
Chevron application (75.88%) in removal cases is comparable with
Barnett and Walker’s finding.197 Courts demonstrate a remarkable
192. See, e.g., Soto-Hernandez v. Holder, 729 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that Chevron
deference applied in cases where the BIA interpreted the immigration ramifications of a criminal
conviction); Totimeh v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 666 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The
BIA’s determination of whether a specific crime involves moral turpitude qualifies for Chevron
deference.”) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)); Mata-Guerrero v.
Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Our review of an agency’s determination of whether a
particular crime should be classified as a crime of moral turpitude ordinarily is deferential under
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984) . . . .”). Contra Familia Rosario v. Holder, 655 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This court
reviews de novo the legal question of whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated felony for
purposes of eligibility for cancellation.”) (citing Guerrero-Perez v. Immigr. & Naturalization
Servs., 242 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2001)).
193. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“We find
these ordinary canons of statutory construction compelling, even without regard to the longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”);
Immig. & Naturalization Servs. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (quoting Immig. &
Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
194. See Slocum, supra note 13, at 517 (“Notwithstanding this recent reference, the role of the
immigration rule of lenity in deportation proceedings is not clear due to the competing deference
doctrine announced in the now-famous case Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. . . . One important issue left unresolved by the Court is the role of canons of
construction in the review of agency interpretations.”); see generally David S. Rubenstein, Putting
the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN.
L. REV. 479 (2007) (dissecting academic literature proposing the incorporation of the rule of lenity
into Chevron Step 1 and arguing that the rule of lenity should be incorporated in Chevron Step 2
instead).
195. See, e.g., Soto-Hernandez, 729 F.3d at 6 (“Ultimately, this case does not require us to
confront whether (and if so, when) the rule of lenity applies in the immigration context . . . .”).
196. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (finding the statutory
language under consideration unambiguous and therefore sidestepping any need to address whether
the rule of lenity or Chevron received priority).
197. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 32 (Chevron deemed to apply in 74.8%
of the global data set).
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consistency in all three subcategories of removal cases—Asylum Relief
(75.32%), Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief (78.26%), and
Miscellaneous Relief (75.82%). Removal cases, as a subset of
immigration cases, appear to comply with the general Chevron
application rate and agency win rates observed by Barnett and Walker.198
This finding accords with Kagan’s analysis of Chevron in immigration
cases before the Supreme Court where he found that “[s]ince AguirreAguirre, the Court has more consistently deferred to the Attorney General
in cases concerning eligibility for asylum. Even in cases where the
government lost, the Court sometimes applied the ordinary remand rule
to send the case back for administrative interpretation in the first
instance.”199 Based on these findings, it does not appear that courts of
appeals recognize any meaningful difference between humanitarian
forms of relief and all the other forms of relief from removal. Courts also
do not appear to recognize any heightened anti-deference considerations
in these categories despite the humanitarian and international law
considerations present in asylum cases.
Table 4: Agency Win Rates
Immigration Category
Detention
Crimmigration
Non-Removal
Removal
Asylum Relief
Non-Asylum Humanitarian Relief
Miscellaneous Relief

TOTAL

N

Agency Win Rate

10
86
37
340

50% (5)
58.14% (50)
62.16% (23)
70.59% (240)

77
23
240

71.43% (55)
65.22% (15)
70.83% (170)

473

67.23% (318)

198. Id. at 6 (noting that the overall agency win rates once Chevron deference was applied was
77.4%).
199. Kagan, supra note 13, at 518–19.
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With regard to agency win rates,200 Barnett and Walker found that
federal agencies prevailed in 71.4% of interpretations overall.201
Comparatively, this study found that immigration interpretations had an
agency win rate of 67.23% overall. While somewhat lower than the
overall agency win rate in the Barnett-Walker study, this lower win rate
is not unprecedented in empirical legal research.202 When we take a
closer look, however, we see that there is significant variation within
immigration cases. While agency interpretations experience high rates of
success in removal cases (75.88% overall) and non-removal cases
(70.27%), agency interpretations are significantly less successful in cases
that implicate detention statutes (50%) or crimmigration (58.14%). This
makes sense as a secondary result of the finding that Supreme Court
justices were significantly less likely to apply Chevron in cases that
implicated individuals “physical liberty” or criminal statutes since
Chevron is a doctrine that favors the agency in these adjudications.203 It
appears that when the Supreme Court speaks, even in less than clear
terms, the courts of appeals listen.
Table 5: Agency Win Rates Once Chevron Applies
Immigration Category
N
Agency
Agency
Interpretation
Interpretation
Wins
Win Rate
Detention
5
2
40.00%
Crimmigration
44
31
70.45%
Non-removal
26
18
69.23%
Removal
258
205
79.46%
Asylum Relief
Non-Asylum
Humanitarian Relief
Miscellaneous Relief

TOTAL

58
18

47
13

81.03%
72.22%

182

145

79.67%

333

256

76.88%

In instances where the reviewing court finds that Chevron does apply,
however, the agency success rates change dramatically. Once we
consider cases where courts held that Chevron applied to the statutory
200. The “win rate,” as used in the Barnett-Walker study, is the rate at which agency
interpretations prevailed globally. This measure is not limited to agency success rates following the
Court’s application of Chevron. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 30.
201. Id. at 28.
202. See Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra note 20, at 1100 (finding that agency interpretations
prevailed 68.3% of the time before the Supreme Court between 1984 and 2006).
203. Kagan, supra note 13, at 512–39; Das, supra note 13, at 180–91.
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interpretation at issue, the agency win rate climbs to 76.88%. This higher
agency win rate is seen in almost all the immigration categories with the
exception of detention cases—which have been reduced to the point of
near oblivion within these parameters. This finding accords with those of
Barnett and Walker, who found that the agency win rate would climb to
77.4% when the court found that Chevron applied.204 Thus, the
application of Chevron appears to have real and dramatic effects on the
agencies’ win rates, generally, as well as in immigration cases,
specifically.
C. Rulemaking Versus Adjudication
Table 6: Chevron Application and Success Rates Across
Interpretation Methods
Agency Interpretation
Chevron Application
Wins
# of
Rate
BW
# of
Rate
BW Rate
Cases
Rate
Cases
Rulemaking
(n=64)

54

84.38%

91.9%

41

64.06%

72.8%

Formal
Adjudication
(n=387)

277

22.73%

76.7%

271

70.03%

74.7%

Informal
Interpretation
(n=22)

5

71.04%

44.8%

9

40.91%

65.0%

336

71.04%

(n/a)

321

67.86%

84.7%205

TOTAL
(n=473)

As discussed above, the BIA, an agency that relies exclusively on
adjudications rather than rulemaking, dominates the immigration data set.
206 More than three-quarters (81.82%) of the 472 interpretations in this
data set resulted from formal BIA adjudications.207 This interpretive
strategy was followed by rulemaking (13.53%), with a small remainder
204. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 30 (“The agency prevailed at a higher rate
than the overall agency-win rate (77.4% to 71.4%) when the court determined that Chevron
applied.”).
205. This statistic is for the global data set once immigration interpretations are excluded.
206. See Family, supra note 13, at 117 (“The Board of Immigration Appeals interprets the INA
through informal adjudication . . . .”).
207. Although immigration adjudications are governed by the INA and not the Administrative
Procedure Act, Barnett and Walker generally categorized immigration adjudications as “formal
adjudications.” Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 35 n.189.
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of the interpretations resulting from informal adjudications (4.65%).
Overall, it appears that Barnett and Walker’s conclusion that Supreme
Court precedent prefers formality when conferring Chevron deference
appears to hold true in the courts of appeals where rulemaking—the most
formal method of interpretation—is the most likely to receive Chevron
deference (84.38%), followed closely by formal adjudications (71.58%).
Informal interpretations in immigration cases receive Chevron deference
at a severely reduced rate (22.72%), which coincides with a similarly low
success rate for informal interpretation (40.91%).
As part of their study, Barnett and Walker reviewed Supreme Court
cases applying Chevron.208 While they did not conduct an empirical
review of these cases, they gleaned general principles that appear to
influence Court’s application of the Chevron precedent. Most notably,
they observed a trend whereby the Court favored granting Chevron
deference in cases where the agency arrived at its interpretation after
methodically applying Chevron with heightened formality.209 Overall,
immigration interpretations appear to track with this preference for
formality, but with a few key distinctions. As shown in Table 6, the rates
at which courts of appeals apply Chevron and accept agency
interpretations appear depressed when compared to the global averages
observed by Barnett and Walker.210 In fact, immigration adjudication
figures appear so depressed that Barnett and Walker removed these
results from the overall data as an outlier and found the overall agency
win rate for adjudications rose ten percentage points from 74.7% with
immigration included to 84.7% when immigration adjudication
interpretations were removed.211
As detailed in Table 6, the downward pressure that immigration
interpretation exerts on global agency win rates is replicated in rates at
which courts apply Chevron in immigration cases. This trend holds for
all three methods of statutory interpretation—rulemaking (84.38%),
adjudication (71.58%), and informal interpretation (22.73)—but is the
most pronounced in cases involving informal interpretations.212
What is interesting from this data is that adjudication, which comprises
a substantial portion of the immigration interpretations in the BarnettWalker data set, is the method of interpretation that tracks most closely
208. Id. at 12–15.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 36.
211. Id.
212. Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 15, at 39 (“Again, however, if the 386
immigration adjudications were removed from the formal adjudication category, the frequency of
applying Chevron deference to formal adjudications would rise nearly ten percentage points to
85.2% and bring the formal formats into closer parity.”).
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with the global trends. This holds true throughout the entire time frame
of the study, as evidenced below. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that
immigration adjudication closely tracks with both the global Chevron
application rate and the agency win rate.
Figure 2: Rates of Applying Chevron in Adjudication over Time
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Figure 3: Agency Win Rates in Adjudication over Time
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D. Disparities Across Federal Circuits
As previously discussed, there is a wide range of circuit court
experience, and therefore expertise, in reviewing immigration
interpretations. One possible explanation for the variations may be that
the circuits’ varied familiarity with immigration agencies and the
contentious nature of the subject matter breeds contempt.213 The Ninth,
Second, and Third Circuits collectively reviewed more than half of all the
immigration statutory interpretations in the revised data set. This
divergence in immigration dockets of the various circuits appears,
however, to have very little influence on a court of appeals’ willingness
to apply Chevron and accept agency interpretations outside of the Ninth
Circuit.
Table 7: Chevron Application Rate by Circuit214
Chevron
Chevron
Chevron
Chevron
Application Application
Application Application
Rate
Rate
First Cir.
24
96.00%
Seventh Cir.
19
55.88%
(n=25)
(n=34)
Second Cir.
(n=83)

54

65.06%

Eighth Cir.
(n=18)

17

94.44%

Third Cir.
(n=81)

61

75.30%

Ninth Cir.
(n=111)

61

54.95%

Fourth Cir.
(n=27)

26

96.29%

Tenth Cir.
(n=61)

13

86.66%

Fifth Cir.
(n=34)

26

76.47%

Eleventh
Cir.
(n=58)

25

89.92%

Sixth Cir.
(n=16)

9

56.25%

As detailed in Table 6, the rates at which courts apply Chevron and
accept agency interpretations tend to travel together. Thus, the greater the
likelihood the circuit deems Chevron applicable, the greater the
likelihood that it will accept the agency’s interpretation. The rate at which
courts deem Chevron applicable and accept the agency’s interpretation,
however, appears to travel independently of the volume of immigration
213. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 183–84 (2010) (finding that
agencies that appeared more frequently before the DC Circuits had lower affirmance rates than
those that did not).
214. The singular case considered by the DC Circuit was omitted from this chart.
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cases the court reviews. For instance, the Ninth, Seventh, and Sixth
Circuits experience starkly different volumes of immigration cases but
both circuits apply Chevron at similar rates. Similarly, both the Second
and Third Circuits review more than twice the volume of immigration
cases than the Fifth Circuit, yet these three circuits applied Chevron at
similar rates. Thus, while circuits demonstrate a wide range of approaches
in their immigration cases, it does not appear that the volume of the cases
plays a significant role in shaping their jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In his concurrence in Pereira, Justice Kennedy called on the Court to
reconsider, in an appropriate future case, the premises that underlie
Chevron and the manner in which courts have implemented the
decision.215 This Article engages in that type of reconsideration by using
immigration law as a case study. As the Supreme Court continues to
evaluate its treatment of Chevron, this Article attempts to disentangle the
various threads implicit in courts of appeals’ current application of
Chevron. The goal of this study is to introduce nuance to the BarnettWalker study’s discussion of immigration cases as well as to attempt to
answer some of the outstanding questions about immigration
idiosyncrasies. While no area of immigration law is exempted entirely
from the Chevron regime, courts of appeals apply this precedent in
drastically different ways and at drastically different rates across these
areas of immigration law.
While this study attempts to answer some of the questions left by the
Barnett-Walker study, many more remain to be understood. The methods
and tools of study could be honed in future endeavors. Moreover, the data
considered is narrow in its focus; future studies may choose to explore
how the courts’ application of Chevron relates to subsequent deference
regimes such as Mead216 or Auer217 deference. Alternatively, future
studies may focus on discerning what other factors shape the circuit
courts’ discordant treatment of Chevron in immigration cases by
considering variables such as political valence and panel effects in
judicial decision-making.
The Supreme Court has concluded that Chevron applies in
immigration cases, but it has yet to fully address how this deference
regime interacts with anti-deference considerations that arise to varying
degrees in immigration cases. Despite this omission, a series of patterns
have emerged in these courts of appeals’ application of Chevron within
215. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
217. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1997).
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various subcategories of immigration law. In order to more effectively
categorize and discuss deference in immigration cases, empirical scholars
must develop new and nuanced frameworks for evaluating data related to
these cases. This study has shown that “immigration law” as a singular
category of administrative law does little to further our understanding of
courts’ application of Chevron. Immigration law, as commonly
understood, is a wide ranging and convoluted body of law. Rather than
presume equal treatment across all areas of immigration law, scholars and
courts should explicitly recognize the anti-deference considerations that
currently shape their practice to create a more consistent Chevron
standard.

